This paper focuses on …rms'incentives to promote innovation. Innovative employees choose whether to disclose their ideas within their …rms, or to form spin-outs. Renegotiations ensue upon internal disclosure, and outcomes are a¤ected by information leakage and status-quo contracts. If the innovators'bargaining position is weak, they prefer forming spin-outs, and …rms use status-quo contracts to deter the increase in competition generated by them. If the innovators'bargaining position is strong, …rms sti ‡e innovation to prevent the rent reshu-ing caused by renegotiation. Innovation bonuses implement bargaining e¢ ciency, while stock-based compensation mitigates, but does not erase, …rms'incentives to discourage innovation.
Introduction
The management of innovation presents an increasingly di¢ cult problem for …rms'survival and growth. On one hand, generating new ideas is crucial for a …rm to maintain its position on the market. On the other hand, these ideas typically originate from employees working in areas close to the …rm's own technology. Innovative employees may decide to renegotiate their contracts, or to leave the …rm to build new enterprises with the knowledge acquired during their tenure. Since …rms may anticipate costly renegotiations and departures, the design of the employees'compensation schemes is a complicated balancing act of harvesting innovation while containing it within.
Firms di¤er substantially in the ways they approach and foster innovation. For example, much has been written about the corporate culture of the Silicon Valley …rms, and how their informal management practices contrast with the traditional structure of East-Coast hightech …rms. 1 While some …rms actively promote employees' creativity through intra-…rm policies (e.g., encouraging cross-department communication, creating independent units within the organization, etc.) and monetary incentives (e.g., setting MBOs, innovation bonuses, etc.), others are more cautious and sometime tend to suppress innovative behavior.
A vast literature addresses the optimal design of incentives in a …rm. 2 However, designing incentives to innovate is atypical for several reasons. First, innovation is, by its own nature, hard to forecast and to describe in an ex-ante contract. Therefore, the division of the rents generated by innovation is often determined by ex-post contract renegotiations.
The second peculiar aspect of innovation incentives'design is that ex-post renegotiations typically entail a disclosure of innovative employees'new idea to their employer ("information leakage"). This disclosure a¤ects the bargaining position of all parties involved and, 1 E.g., see Saxenian (1996) and references therewith. 2 For a survey, see for example Gibbons (1998). in particular, it negatively a¤ects the employee's outside option. Indeed, if the negotiation fails, the employee and the …rm go their separate ways and both sides are in the position of implementing the new idea. As intellectual property rights (IPR, henceforth) may prevent either of the two parties from fully exploiting the idea, they ultimately determine the extent to which information leakage in ‡uences bargaining outcomes.
In this paper, we analyze a …rm's optimal innovation-management problem when the …rm anticipates the e¤ects described above. Consider a …rm producing an original patented product and one of its employees. The model has three periods. In the …rst period, the …rm designs its innovation-management strategy by o¤ering the employee a contract. The structure of this contract includes a status-quo payment (which can take the form of a …xed payment or, as discussed in Section 5, a share of the …rm's pro…t) and, if the disclosure of innovation is veri…able in court, a payment associated to the discovery of a new idea (e.g. an innovation bonus). In the second period, after the contract is signed, the employee has the possibility of investing some e¤ort in the discovery of innovative ideas.
If the employee discovers a new idea, there are several actions he might take in the third period. First, the employee can leave the …rm and form a spin-out without disclosing the idea internally. Second, the employee has the option to keep his idea to himself without implementing it, maintaining his current contract and position in the …rm. Finally, the innovator can disclose his idea within the …rm. 3 We assume that whenever an idea is disclosed, all the information that is relevant for its implementation leaks to the …rm. 4 If an idea is disclosed internally, the employee can renegotiate his contracts within the …rm. The outcome of this renegotiation depends on the bargaining power of the players involved and on their outside options in case of a renegotiation breakdown. In particular, the innovator's outside options include staying employed under the initial contract as well as leaving the …rm and forming a spin-out. In the latter case, because of information leakage, the original …rm will be able compete against the spin-out on the new product market. The extent of this competition crucially depends on the intellectual property rights (IPR henceforth) legislation and its enforcement: If the employee has the legal tools to protect himself against the risk of expropriation, his outside option in the renegotiation is relatively high. On the other hand, if the …rm has IPR over its employees'innovations, the innovator's outside option is relatively low.
As a …rst step, we analyze the e¤ect of the initial contract on the decisions of the employee in the subsequent stages. We then step back and focus on the optimal contract problem from the …rm's point of view. By choosing the initial contract, the …rm a¤ects the employee's incentives in two fundamental ways: First, by setting the status-quo payment above the expected rents from both a spin-out and an internal disclosure, the …rm can discourage the innovator from being innovative. Second, the …rm can manipulate ex-ante the innovator's outside option in the renegotiation. Indeed, if the employee's compensation after an internal disclosure is high enough (in particular, higher than the innovator's payo¤ in a spin-out after the information has been leaked to the …rm), the innovator's threat of forming a spin-out upon negotiation breakdown loses credibility. Therefore, the presence of information leakage allows the …rm to protect its bargaining position at a relatively low price.
In Section 3, we consider the benchmark case in which internal disclosure is veri…able by a court, so that the …rm is able to commit to a payment to be paid upon an employee's disclosure of a new idea. Indeed, while internal disclosure is often hard to verify, there are some examples of …rms that have successfully implemented innovation-based bonus schemes. 5 In our …rst result, we show that innovation-contingent rewards are a contractual 5 Examples documented in the literature are the innovation bonuses paid sometimes by Japanese compa-tool powerful enough to always promote innovation within the …rm and implement the bargaining e¢ cient outcome in equilibrium. The intuition for this result is the following:
In order to invest in innovation, the employee must anticipate a large enough increase in payo¤ as a result of a new idea. Such payo¤ increase can come either from the formation of a spin-out, or a successful intra-…rm renegotiation, or an innovation bonus. The ability to commit to innovation bonuses allows the …rm to compensate the employee for the payo¤ a spin-out would yield if he leaves the …rm without internal disclosure. Moreover, since information leakage always lowers the spin-out pro…t, such compensation is also su¢ cient to make the threat of departure from the …rm in case of negotiation breakdown not credible.
This e¤ectively guarantees that no renegotiation ever happens in equilibrium. Finally, by introducing a wedge between the status-quo payment and the innovation bonus, the …rm guarantees that the innovator's incentives to innovate are preserved.
In Section 4 we analyze the optimal contract problem in the case in which internal disclosures are impossible to verify in court. In this case the payments promised in the contract cannot be conditional on an internal disclosure, and the …rm is left with one contractual tool, the status-quo …xed payment, to preserve the incentives to innovate as well as to prevent the innovator from leaving the …rm. The optimal contract in this case depends on the employee's relative bargaining position vis-à-vis the …rm in case of internal disclosure.
In particular, we identify two e¤ects that motivate …rms to discourage innovation in their …rms. When the employee's bargaining position is relatively weak, he is more inclined to leave the …rm and form a spin-out than disclosing his ideas to his employer. The main problem that the …rm faces in this case is its own inability to commit not to expropriate the nies, as well as reward schemes connected to an internal database for collecting and processing new product ideas (see Herstatt and al., 2006) . The ability of these …rms to sustain such remuneration policies could be due to strong reputational concerns.
employee's invention if he were to disclose his idea internally. We name this e¤ect the "inner hold-up". If new ideas are su¢ ciently threatening from the …rm's point of view, this e¤ect might yield an optimal contract entailing a status-quo payment high enough to discourage the employee from investing in innovation. This suggests that, in an environment in which employees'IPR vis-à-vis their employers are weak, innovative ideas are either implemented by start-ups (when su¢ ciently distinct from preexisting products), or not implemented at all. This result is supported by a large body of empirical work, which shows how in states in which established …rm's IPR (such as no-compete agreements or trade secrets) are strongly enforced, new ideas'implementation within established …rms tends to stagnate. 6 On the other hand, when the innovator's position is strong, the employer's main concern is the potential threat of a contract renegotiation. In particular, an employee with a strong bargaining position will be able to appropriate a large part of the innovation rents at the expense of the original …rm's owners. We term this e¤ect on the owners of the …rm the "reverse hold-up". However, the employer still has a tool to manipulate this outcome, which is setting the status-quo payment at a level high enough to damage the employee's bargaining position at the renegotiation stage-that is, by making the threat of leaving the …rm after a disclosure not credible. The …rm might decide to take this route if the reshu-ing of rents caused by a contract renegotiation is large relative to the cost of the status-quo contract that guarantees the innovator not to undertake an innovation's e¤ort.
Since innovation-based payments achieve the …rst best but are hard to implement, and …xed-payment contracts yield bargaining ine¢ cient outcomes, it is natural to consider how other …rm's policies, such as stock-based compensation, would change the incentives of an innovative employee. In Section 5 we show that the additional possibility of compensating the employee with shares mitigates both the inner and the reverse hold-up e¤ects, but does not completely solve them. Indeed, in the case of the inner-hold-up problem, stock-based compensation enables the …rm to promote internal disclosure, but the …rm does not always …nd it pro…table to induce it. Similarly, in the case of the reverse hold-up problem, stockbased compensation allows the …rm to weaken the bargaining position of the innovator, and to mitigate the loss of rents in ex-post renegotiation. However, we show that the …rm might still …nd it pro…table to discourage innovation. In addition, we show that when both contractual tools are available, innovation bonuses perform better than stock-based compensation from the …rm's point of view.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a literature review, we introduce the model in Section 2. In Section 3, we study the case in which an internal disclosure is veri…able by a court, and, in Section 4, we turn to the case of non-veri…able internal disclosure. Section 5 addresses the extension of our model to the cases in which the employee's compensation scheme includes …rm's shares, and in Section 6 we conclude.
Literature Review
Our analysis is related to several strands of existing work. First, there is a growing literature that analyzes di¤erent aspects of the optimal design of incentives to encourage innovation within a …rm. Hellman and Thiele (2011) develop a multi-tasking model to analyze the workers' trade-o¤ between performing standard tasks and investing in new investment opportunities. Hvide and Kristiansen (2011) , study the …rm's optimal litigation policies with respect to workers that invest in innovation and may leave the …rm after new ideas are discovered. Manso (2011) shows that encouraging CEOs and managers to be innovative requires the use of speci…c contractual tools such as tolerance for failure and commitment to long-term compensation. 7 Parallel to this literature, several papers study the nature of incentives (monetary and pecuniary) that motivate researchers to innovate. For example, an empirical analysis by Sauermann and Cohen (2010) shows that monetary incentives play a signi…cant role in encouraging R&D research, as well as other motives such as desire for intellectual challenge, or responsibility do. 8 Our work focus on monetary incentives only, and their desirability from a …rm's perspective. Anton and Yao (1994) and (1995) (2000), and Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006) , are all papers that analyze the informational concerns of innovators facing the risk of expropriation when they reveal their ideas to other parties. 9 Among these, the most relevant reference for our approach is Anton and Yao (1995) , which, similarly to our paper, focuses on an innovator's decision regarding whether to leave the …rm and form a spin-out. Anton and Yao's paper shares our emphasis on information leakage, and as in our paper, the risk of information leakage modi…es the innovator's incentives to reveal his idea within the …rm and may result in ine¢ cient spin-outs. In contrast, our focus is on the …rms' incentives to manage innovation.
The patterns of worker mobility and spin-out formation have been analyzed also by several others including Scotchmer (1991), Klepper and Sleeper (2000) , Klepper (2001) , Franco and Filson (2006) , and Lewis and Yao (2003) . Moreover, Pakes and Nitzan (1983) analyze the optimal contract problem for personnel that may leave the …rm to form spin-out enterprises. Since in their setting both parties have complete information about the value of innovations, and the impact of information leakage on bargaining is not considered, the equilibrium outcome are always e¢ cient. Hellman and Perotti (2011) model the di¤erence 8 Among others, see also Lazear (1997) , and Stern (2004). 9 In Baccara and Razin (2007) we analyze a bargaining protocol that allows for information leakage and study its implications on the rent division across an innovator and a development team. In this paper, we take a reduced-form approach to the bargaining stage while still allowing for a parameterization that captures a rich range of innovation types and legal environments.
between intra-…rm innovation and innovation through spin-out as a di¤erence in the level of protection of intellectual property rights. Hellmann (2007) builds a model that describes how alternative corporate policies can a¤ect the rate at which new ideas are generated.
Franco and Mitchell (2008) and Rauch and Watson (2010) study the impact of the legal environment (and, more precisely, the presence of non-compete covenants) and the workers' …nancial constraints on the rate of entrepreneurship in the economy. 10 Finally, Chatterjee Finally, our analysis formalizes the notion that large established …rms are often stagnant and prone to dissolution by small innovative spin-outs. Explanations for this puzzle are often based on unawareness or bounded rationality of established …rms when making decisions regarding new technologies. In particular, Christensen (1997) suggests that established …rms tend to focus too much attention on their current customer base, not realizing that existing customers are not necessarily the best predictors of tomorrow's market trends. In our analysis the same prediction arises due to the bargaining position of employees vis-à-vis the …rm and the constraints on contracting over future innovations.
Assume that there is a …rm producing an established product and that production requires labor as input. Let us assume for simplicity that in order to produce, the …rm needs to hire exactly one employee. Potential employees have a reservation value of zero.
There are three periods, t = 0; 1; 2. In period t = 0, the …rm selects a contract to o¤er to the employee. At t = 1; while working for the …rm, the employee decides whether to exert a costly and unobservable e¤ort to discover an innovative idea for a product. Let the cost of e¤ort be c > 0: For the sake of simplicity, we assume that if the employee decides to exert the e¤ort, he discovers a new idea with probability one. If he discovers a new idea the period before, at t = 2; the innovator must decide whether to implement his idea within the …rm ("internal disclosure"), to leave the …rm to form a rival spin-out …rm, or to keep his idea to himself and remain in the …rm under his original contract. As speci…ed in Section 2.3, an internal disclosure may yield to a renegotiation of the employee's contract. A crucial assumption of our analysis is that of information leakage: if he decides to implement his idea within the …rm (and possibly renegotiate his contract) the employee has to disclose his idea to the …rm's o¢ cials. Since an extension of the model in which internal implementation entails only a partial disclosure of the idea would yield results qualitatively similar to ours, for simplicity here we assume that the employee willing to implement his idea within the …rm has to fully disclose his idea to the employer. Thus, upon disclosure, both the employee and the employer hold the technology to produce the new product. We describe how the game unfolds in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
Market Structure Assumptions
The market can accommodate two …rms, the incumbent …rm (F ) and a potential spinout (S), and two products, the original product (O) and the new one (N ). The pro…ts for …rm j 2 fF; Sg; are given by j ( ) where 2 f(O; ;) ; (N; ;) ; (O; N ) ; (N; N )g represents one of the following market con…gurations: (O; ;) is a market in which there is only the incumbent producing the old product; (N; ;) is a market in which there is only the incumbent producing both the old and the new products; (O; N ) is a market in which the incumbent produces the old product and the spin-out is the only …rm holding the technology of the new product; and (N; N ) is a market in which both the incumbent and the spin-out hold the technology to produce the new product. We also N ) ; where the inequality may be strict due to some degree of interrelation (substitutability or complementarity) between the old and the new products. Moreover, there is rent loss due to competition in the new-product market i.e., F (N; ;)
that bargaining e¢ ciency requires the incumbent to implement the new product in-house and to realize the surplus of F (N; ;).
This framework allows to capture di¤erent IPR regimes, and innovation types. For example, if the innovative employee can acquire full IPR on his idea before disclosing it within the …rm, the incumbent is not able to pro…t from it upon disclosure. In this case, We will often use combinations of the above terms. First, we denote the value of monopoly on the innovative idea by
We de…ne the value generated by the innovation if it is implemented through a spin-out as
Note that, while V M is always non-negative, if the new idea is su¢ ciently close to the original product V S could be negative.
Timing
At t = 0, the incumbent o¤ers the employee a contract. The contract takes the form
where v is the payment to the employee in the status quo, and v ID is the payment if the employee discloses a new idea within the …rm. 11;12 We impose the following restrictions on the feasible contracts: (i) The employee is …nancially constrained i.e., v; v ID 0; (ii)
In the analysis in Section 3, the disclosure of a new idea within a …rm is veri…able by a court, implying v 6 = v ID .
In Section 4, we analyze the case in which disclosure of a new idea is not-veri…able, or v = v ID .
At t = 1, the employee decides whether to invest c to discover a new idea. If he does, a new idea is discovered, and the employee has three choices at t = 2:
1. The employee discloses the idea within the …rm. The ensuing renegotiation of his contract (see below) will determine the rent division between the incumbent and employee.
2. The employee leaves the …rm without disclosing his idea, forms a spin-out, and appropriates S (O; N ), while the incumbent gets F (O; N ). 13 1 1 It is immediate to see that, if the …rm can impose a penalty on the employee for leaving the …rm, it will always set this penalty as high as possible. Therefore, for simplicity, we set the maximal penalty to be zero. 1 2 In Section 5; we allow for a stock-based contract, in which the owner of the original …rm o¤ers the employee a share 1 of the …rm's pro…ts. 1 3 In this setting we do not allow the employee to join a di¤erent established …rm, where he would 3. The employee does not innovate and gets v, while the …rm receives F (O; ;) v:
If the employee doesn't invest c, the game ends after t = 1, and payo¤s are v for the innovator and F (O; ;) v for the incumbent. We assume that the cost of e¤ort c, while strictly positive, is very low. In particular, we assume c < minf F (N; ;) F (O; ;); S (O; N ) S (N; N )g: This allows us to focus on the cases in which innovation is always desirable from a monopolist's perspective-that is, a …rm able to mantain a monopoly on new products would always choose to innovate.
Contract Renegotiation with Information Leakage
If the employee decides to exert the e¤ort to be innovative and discloses the idea within the …rm he is working for, a renegotiation of his contract might ensue. As mentioned above, and the payo¤ of the employee is
If S (N; N ) < v ID , the Nash bargaining solution payo¤s are equal to the outside options-i.e., F (N; ;) v ID for the …rm and v ID for the employee. To summarize, if we let z F and z E be the payo¤s of the …rm and the innovator after an internal disclosure, we
In this section, we consider the benchmark case in which …rms are able to commit to a payment conditional on the disclosure of a new idea-that is, we allow for v 6 = v ID . Although internal disclosure is typically di¢ cult to verify in court, reputation considerations or internal protocols sometimes enable …rms to make such commitments. For example, Harryson (1996) reports that Japanese …rms frequently implement an internal proposal system of new ideas connected with a rewarding scheme. Also, Herstatt and al. (2006), after surveying a representative sample of Japanese …rms, document that about 30% of them use databases to store and process new product ideas sought internally. Moreover, innovation bonus systems as a way to reward creative employees have been implemented increasingly often in Europe. 14 In the next result, we show that the presence of innovation bonuses allows the incumbent to always reach the e¢ cient bargaining outcome.
Proposition 1 (Veri…able Internal Disclosure) When internal disclosure is veri…able, it always occurs in equilibrium.
The intuition of Proposition 1 is the following. When idea disclosure is veri…able, the …rm has two tools, v and v ID , to in ‡uence the employee's subsequent behavior. First, by creating a wedge between v and v ID ; the …rm can ensure the innovator pays the cost c and generates a new idea. Second, since the outside option of the employee in the renegotiation with the …rm is the maximum between v ID (the payo¤ of staying in his contract upon negotiation break-up) and S (N; N ) (the payo¤ from walking away after the idea has been disclosed), the …rm has the ability to make the employee's threat of forming a spin-out in case of a negotiation breakdown not credible by setting any v ID S (N; N ). As for the employee walking out with his idea without disclosure and appropriating S (O; N );
it is enough for the …rm to set v ID = S (O; N ) (which is higher than the lower bound S (N; N ) ), to guarantee that internal disclosure dominates this option from the employee's point of view. After paying the innovator v ID = S (O; N ), the …rm is able to appropriate the residual monopolist rent F (N; ;) S (O; N ); making this the optimal course of action from the …rm's perspective.
Non-Veri…able Internal Disclosure (v ID = v)
In this section, we consider the case that internal disclosure is not veri…able by a courtthat is, the contract has to satisfy the condition v ID = v. This is the case, for instance, when there is no veri…able intra-…rm record of the ideas disclosed by the employees, or the …rms do not have enough reputational concerns to be able to commit to a payment scheme conditional on employees'disclosure of their ideas.
The next Lemma characterizes the optimal decision of the innovator as a function of the contract v.
Lemma 1 (Innovator' s Choice) The innovator's optimal decision is as follows: In case the employee can pose a credible threat of walking away in an intra-…rm negotiation-that is, if v S (N; N ), his optimal course of action depends on the comparison between the rents he is able to extract in such renegotiation, s E , vis-à-vis the rents that can be extracted through a spin-out, S (O; N ).
Let us now turn to the characterization of the optimal contract. If disclosure is not veri…able, the …rm has just one contractual tool, v to a¤ect both the employee's incentives to invest in innovation and the course of action to take when an idea comes about. Given the cost of innovation c; inducing the employee to innovate requires creating a wedge between his original contract v and the rents he appropriates from a new idea. Since disclosure is not veri…able, this cannot be no longer contractually designed by setting v ID far enough from v, as in Section 3. Therefore, this wedge must originate from either the formation of a spin-out, or the anticipation of an increase in salary via an intra-…rm renegotiation.
Below we highlight two e¤ects that can potentially lead to ine¢ cient equilibrium outcomes. The …rst e¤ect, that we name "inner hold-up", occurs when the bargaining position of the employee in a renegotiation is relatively weak-that is, s E < S (O; N ). In this case, the incumbent …rm lacks the ability to commit to compensate the innovator when he discloses his idea internally, causing an intra-…rm hold-up problem. Thus, by Lemma 1, an internal disclosure cannot occur in equilibrium, and the innovator will leave the …rm as Note that, from the …rm's point of view, an internal renegotiation entails learning the information and being able, at least to some extent, to compete against a spin-out in case of negotiation breakdown. Therefore an internal renegotiation always guarantees the …rm F (N; N ) , which dominates the payo¤ if a spin-out forms, F (O; N ).
Since allowing a spin-out is never optimal, identifying the best strategy for the …rm's point of view amounts to comparing the payo¤ in case of a intra-…rm renegotiation with the payo¤ the …rm appropriates discouraging innovation. Setting a contract scheme that discourages innovation is optimal if the cost such a contract, S (O; N ) c, is smaller than the shift of rents to the employee that the …rm will su¤er in case of an internal disclosure with respect to the status-quo. Such shift is equal to F (O; ;) s F :
Proposition 3 has a few implications. First, the condition
suggests that the incentives to discourage innovation are more severe the stronger the employee's bargaining position in the renegotiation is. In particular, the reshu-ing e¤ect is stronger as S (N; N ) increases with respect to F (N; N ), i.e., the stronger the IPR of the employee vis-à-vis the …rm in the new-product market.
Second, suppose that the potential competition on the new product market is strong a …xed wage v on our results in Section 4. The bene…t of such an contract scheme is that, by internalizing the e¤ects of his actions on the original …rm's value, it can increase the incentives of the employee to disclose his idea within the …rm. 16 Let us assume that the original owner o¤ers the employee a share of the …rm's value
(1 ); while keeping for himself. Under this scenario, specifying the payo¤s upon agent's departure requires making some assumption on how competition will unfold with two …rms on the market, one of which is partially owned by the founder of the second.
In order to highlight the main point of our analysis, we maintain the assumption that the payment to the employee does not include any control stake, so that ownership overlaps do not a¤ect the way in which the competition unfolds between two …rms. Also, some stock-based compensation schemes might require an agent to surrender their shares in case of departure. We assume that shares'ownership can be maintained upon departure from the …rm.
The payo¤ of the innovator in the status-quo is To summarize, if we de…ne as e z F and e z E the payo¤s of the …rm and the innovator, respectively, after an internal disclosure, we have
We now show that the availability of stock-based compensation enhances the …rm's pro…ts with respect to the …xed payments schemes considered in Section 4. Consider the case of the inner hold-up …rst (i.e., s E < S (O; N )): Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 suggest that, since the bargaining position of an innovator in an ex-post renegotiation is weak, an internal disclosure never occurs in equilibrium. However, the option of o¤ering a partnership allows the …rm to mitigate the expropriation su¤ered by the innovator in the ex-post renegotiation in case of an internal disclosure, and to promote internal disclosure.
The next proposition shows that, although stock-based compensation is a tool that allows the …rm to implement internal disclosure, in some cases the …rm will still …nd pro…table to allow spin-out to form, or to discourage innovation altogether. Thus, the option of stockbased compensation mitigates, but does not solve completely, the inner hold-up problem. To conclude, although the option of o¤ering stock-based compensation to potential employees mitigates both the inner and the reverse hold-up problems, and it increases bargaining e¢ ciency with respect to …xed-payment contracts (as analyzed in Section 4), it doesn't not solve either of these problems entirely, as innovation bonuses do. In addition, the next corollary shows that when both these contractual tools are available, from the …rm's point of view innovation bonuses perform better than stock-based contracts.
Corollary 1 When both contractual tools are available, the …rm is better o¤ using innovation bonuses than stock-based contracts.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the incentives to promote innovation in …rms. We …nd that when the innovator's IPR in the …rm are weak, in order to prevent expropriation, the innovator may leave the …rm to form a spin-out without …rst trying to disclose his idea internally. In that case, the …rm may set up an ex-ante compensation scheme to prevent spin-out formation. On the other hand, when IPR protect the position of innovative employees in the intra-…rm renegotiation process, the …rm may have an incentive to sti ‡e innovation, fearing the rent reshu-ing caused by innovation implementation. We show that, if innovation bonuses are a viable contractual tool, they are always su¢ cient to implement the bargaining e¢ cient outcome. We also address the possibility for the …rm to o¤er stock-based compensation and we show that such additional tool mitigates bargaining ine¢ ciencies, but does not solve them entirely. Step 3. Finally, let us see when using stock-based compensation rather than a …xed-payment contract is pro…table for the …rm. 
